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Income, economic freedom, and corruption interact in complex ways as all three 
variables are arguably endogenous. We explicitly model this endogeneity using a 
panel VAR framework. The pVAR models we estimate are able to explicitly model 
this endogeneity better than the single-equation panel data models previously used 
in the literature. Using data on corruption and income from the World Bank and 
economic freedom from the Fraser Institute, we provide evidence that corruption 
and the absence of economic freedom have a negative effect on national income. 
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The Efficient Corruption Hypothesis, and the Dynamics between  
Economic Freedom, Corruption, and National Income 
 
 
“In terms of economic growth, the only thing worse than a society with a rigid, 
over-centralized, dishonest bureaucracy is one with a rigid, over-centralized, 
honest bureaucracy” (Huntington, 1968, p.386). 
 
1 Introduction 
Economists and political scientists seem endlessly fascinated by the relationship between 
corruption and economic performance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Mauro, 1995; Campos, 1999; 
Bologna, 2016). The earliest thinking was that a well-functioning economy relied on proper 
institutions.1 Corrupt bureaucrats personified inefficient institutions. The bribes they demanded 
were seen as an unnecessary tax on businesses, which would invariably cause distortions, 
deadweight loss, inefficiency, and poverty.  
That thinking was turned on its head in the 1960s, primarily by Leff (1964) and 
Huntington (1968), who argued that corruption – in some circumstances – provided a much-
needed safety valve from stifling bureaucracy. In such circumstances, corruption “greased the 
wheels” of commerce by greasing the palms of corrupt officials. This line of thought was revived 
more recently in the work of Shleifer and Vishny (1993) and Mauro (1995). The common thread 
in most modern corruption research is that corruption may be beneficial–as a second best–when 
red tape and regulation is high.2 Another way of putting it is that corruption might improve upon 
the state of affairs when there is little economic freedom in a country.3  
                                                          
1 There is a large empirical literature on the effect of institutions following Knack and Keefer’s (1995) seminal 
paper. Unfortunately, this literature is too large for us to do justice to it here.  
2 Dawson and Seater (2013) demonstrate the negative effect of regulations on growth.  
3 Economic freedom is certainly multi-dimensional and more than just bureaucracy (Bologna and Hall, 2014; 
Gwartney et al. 2016). However, the majority of economic freedom areas (property rights, rule of law, freedom to 




Research on the relationship between corruption, national income/growth and economic 
freedom can be categorized as follows: 
(1) Does economic freedom or national income affect corruption?  
(2) Does corruption or national income affect economic freedom?  
(3) Does economic freedom or corruption affect national income? 
 
Figure 1: The relationship between corruption, economic freedom, and growth 
 
 
Taken together, it seems as though everyone acknowledges that freedom, corruption, and income 
are jointly determined as depicted in Figure 1. And yet, to our knowledge no one has investigated 
all of the endogenous connections between them. We fill this gap by using a panel VAR 
framework to answer all of these questions simultaneously. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First, we provide a brief review of the 
literature, paying special attention to the three questions above. Then describe our data, before 
estimating a fully endogenous model of the dynamics between economic freedom, corruption, 
and income. Finally, we investigate a set of panel-data models that focus on question three, 






paying special attention to the hypothesis that corruption acts as a safety valve from over-
regulation. We close with a summary of the findings. 
 
2 Literature review 
Why are some countries so riddled with corruption? Do corrupt actors have so much to gain with 
so little to lose? Does a poor economy provide fertile ground for corruption? Or does corruption 
flourish according to the institutional setting in which it is planted?  Does corruption find a place 
to hide, and indeed thrive, among the overgrown weeds of bureaucracy? Does corruption plant 
its own seeds, so that it is self-perpetuating? 
There is a large empirical and theoretical literature on corruption trying to answer these 
questions. Banerjee et al. (2013) provide a good overview of this literature. For our purposes, we 
are most interested in the literature on how economic freedom (institutions) affect corruption. 
Saha et al. (2009) find that economic freedom and democracy generally provide enough sunshine 
to combat corruption. However, democracy may increase corruption if a country is currently 
highly regulated. Pieroni and d’Agostino (2013) investigated whether the institutional 
environment, specifically economic freedom, is inversely correlated with corruption. They find 
that “market competition may be bad for corruption when institutions are weak, as they often are 
in developing countries although, in general, the aggregate index confirms that competition 
reduces corruption… A lack of government regulations may actually yield more corruption in 
less developed countries, whereas standard recipes for greater freedom can be applied in 
developed countries” (Pieroni and d’Agostino, p. 70).  
A number of other empirical papers also explore economic freedom’s relationship with 
corruption. Goel and Nelson (2005) consider whether political or economic freedom (or its 
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components) affect corruption, concluding that economic freedom (especially in the monetary 
realm) is most effective at combating corruption. Graeff and Mehlkop (2003) examine the effect 
of economic freedom and its individual components on corruption. They find that the magnitude 
of economic freedom’s effect on corruption depends upon whether the country is rich or poor. 
Shen and Williamson (2005) treat EFW as exogenous and find that it decreases corruption, 
however, they do not consider the alternative causal scenario where corruption might affect 
economic freedom. Using panel data and the Arellano and Bond (1991) method to instrument for 
corruption and investment, Swaleheen and Stansel (2007) find that corruption is bad for 
economic growth when economic freedom is low, but positive when economic freedom levels 
are high.  Heckelman and Powell (2010) find the opposite of Swaleheen and Stansel (2007), 
namely that corruption positively affects growth in low economic freedom environments but 
erodes as economic freedom increases. Carden and Verdon (2010) find that some types of 
corruption can lead to increases in economic growth when economic freedom is low.  
Corruption is but one possible determinant of economic freedom. The question of why 
some countries are more economically free than others has been a growing area of research in 
economics. One of the earliest papers in this area is Dawson (1998), who finds a positive 
relationship between political freedom and economic freedom. Wu and Davis (1999), however, 
find no such relationship. Recent papers using more years of data find that political freedom or 
democratic transitions lead to economic freedom (Aixalá and Fabro, 2009; Rode and Coll, 2012). 
Hall (2016), however, finds no evidence that democracy has led to institutional convergence. 




Regulations that lower economic freedom clearly benefit individuals who attempt to seek 
rents through corruption. Kurer (1993) developed a theoretical model where the degree of red 
tape is endogenous to a model of corruption. That is, corrupt public servants will often increase 
the amount of red tape and inefficiency, so that they can then provide citizens with a convenient 
escape route—for a fee. Corruption, in this case, causes a decline in economic freedom, and this 
decline further reduces income over and above the usual costs of rent seeking.  Similarly, 
Kaufmann and Wei (1999) developed a formal model where bureaucracy is endogenously 
determined with the size of the bribe. The prospect of ill-gotten gains invites the bureaucrat to 
create additional red tape, so that they might sell a way around the rules. Again, corruption 
diminishes economic freedom. Bjørnskov (2012) empirically finds that corruption leads to 
greater barriers to trade, especially when the corruption occurs in an already poor country.  
By far the largest literature on corruption relates to how it effects national income or 
growth. For example, corruption can be bad for growth because of its effect on investment 
(Mauro, 1995). Meon and Sekkat (2005) find that corruption directly lowers growth in addition 
to indirectly lowering growth by diminishing investment. Several studies have found that 
corruption decreases foreign direct investment (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; and Egger and Winner, 
2005; Brada et al, 2012). Pavlik (2018) highlights the role that uncertainty surrounding 
corruption plays with respect to growth.4  
Murphy et al. (1991) also argue that the prospect of being a wealthy corrupt bureaucrat 
might entice young entrepreneurial talent from productive to extractive pursuits. Corruption 
might also exacerbate cash and credit constraints among budding entrepreneurs, thereby 
misallocating technology and capital (Murphy et al., 1993). In a similar vein, Choi and Thum 
                                                          
4 There is also a large literature on the relationship between economic freedom and growth. See, Compton et al. 
(2011) for a representative paper and Hall and Lawson (2014) for a summary of this literature.  
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(2004) present a theoretical model where the threat of corruption changes the incentives facing 
entrepreneurs to make lasting investments. Instead, they opt for the flexibility of fly-by-night 
investments. Such investments do not provide for sustained economic growth. 
Kaufmann and Wei (1999) develop a formal model where the amount of red tape is 
endogenously determined with the size of the bribe. Firms find themselves, effectively, in a 
prisoner’s dilemma where bribery is individually rational, yet costly. Endogeneity effectively 
eliminates the “grease the wheels” hypothesis in their model. Further, they find that those 
manufacturing firms who bribe have higher costs, in terms of time spent as well as cost-of-
capital, than those who do not bribe. Kaufmann and Wei are strongly in the camp that corruption 
is inefficient. Fisman and Svensson (2007) provide additional microeconomic evidence at the 
firm level that suggests increases in bribery payments are correlated with decreased rates of firm 
growth. Extrapolating to the country level corruption is clearly sand in the wheels of commerce. 
In a paper closely related to ours, Mo (2001) considers the transmission mechanism 
through which corruption might affect economic growth. Corruption can affect various factors, 
which in turn, affect growth. He finds evidence that corruption’s effect on political instability has 
the most impact on growth, followed by the share of private investment, and human capital. 
However, Mo does not consider whether the effect of corruption might depend upon the 
institutional setting of the country. While he controls for political rights, he does not control for 
economic institutions. Further, by including it additively, his model does not allow institutions to 
mitigate the effects of corruption. Finally, he does not exploit the panel-nature of the available 
data. 
Controlling for economic and political institutions is important given the work of de Vaal 
and Ebben (2011). They develop a theoretical model where the effect of bureaucratic corruption 
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on growth depends upon economic institutions. Corruption in an inefficient bureaucracy 
increases efficiency. In an otherwise healthy institutional setting, however, it is an economic bad. 
According to de Vaal and Ebben (2011, p. 12), “Only when the amount or political stability or 
property rights protection is above some threshold value, corruption affects these institutions 
negatively, depressing economic growth. This implies that the institutional framework is 
important for determining the corruption-growth relationship....”  
In all of the literature, the endogeneity of corruption is a widely recognized problem, 
especially for the efficient corruption hypothesis. In his review of the literature, Bardhan (1997, 
p. 1323) explains that   
“It is usually presumed that a given set of [regulatory] distortions are mitigated or 
circumvented by the effects of corruption; but quite often these distortions and 
corruption are caused or at least preserved or aggravated by the same common 
factors. The distortions are not exogenous to the system and are instead often part 
of the built-in corrupt practices of [the]…system.” 
Svennson (2005, pp.36-7) clearly articulates this point with respect to the efficient 
corruption hypothesis:  
“The proponents of ‘efficient corruption’… take the distortions circumvented by 
the corrupt actions as given. In most cases, distortions and corruption are caused 
by, or are symptoms of, the same set of underlying factors. As Myrdal (1968) 
pointed out, corrupt officials may not circumvent distortions, but instead actually 
cause greater administrative delays to attract more bribes.”  
For this reason, we build toward a fully articulated model where economic institutions measured 





3 Data and a First Look 
To measure corruption, we employ two different measures of corruption from the World Bank’s 
Control of Corruption dataset.  (1) CE, an absolute index of corruption, and (2) CP, a country’s 
corruption percentile (i.e. relative ranking). CE gives the country’s corruption score in units of a 
standard normal distribution, i.e. ranging from approximately -2.59 to 2.06. That is, it is in terms 
of standard deviations.5 Being a percentile, CP ranges from 0 to 100.  While there are other 
corruption datasets, such as those by Political Risk Service (PRS), the International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG), and Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, these measures 
of corruption are all highly correlated with each other. This is not surprising given that CE is 
comprised of data from many sources, including PRS and ICRG. Given the high correlation 
across measures and the public availability of the World Bank data, we opt to use CE and CP in 
our analysis.  
We also employ the World Bank’s national income data (rGDPpc), measured as real 
GDP per capita in constant 2005 US dollars. Data on economic freedom (EFW) are taken from 
the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World dataset (Gwartney et al. 2016).  The EFW 
index measures the extent to which the policies and institutions of a country are consistent with 
economic freedom.6 Chain-linked and unadjusted data were available.7 We used the unadjusted 
                                                          
5 The Control of Corruption dataset is part of the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators. According to 
their documentation, “Control of corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and 
private interests (Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2017).”As an index, their data is compiled from a number of 
sources. Interested readers should see the full documentation available on the WGI site.  
6 For more background on the EFW index and the literature that has used it, see Hall and Lawson (2014).  
7 There exists a second measure of economic freedom, the Index of Economic Freedom (Miller et al. 2019). 
Although the two economic freedom indices differ in substantive ways, the correlation between the two indices over 
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numbers from 2002-2013.8 EFW is reported on a 0-10 scale, with larger values representing 
higher levels of economic freedom. While there are currently 159 countries in the EFW report, 
we need at least nine annual observations for each country using our empirical approach. Thus 
we exclude from our data set any country that was not in the EFW annually beginning in 2005.  
The data are summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
rGDPpc 1,755 11,440 15,976 135 86,129 
EFW 1,589 6.8 0.9 2.9 9.2 
CE 1,767 -0.06 1.03 -2.55 1.82 
CP 1,767 48.82 28.71 0.00 100.00 
 
To get a better sense of the relationship between corruption, economic freedom, and 
national income we created scatterplots. The first thing one sees when looking scatterplots of 
corruption, economic freedom, and national income is how strongly correlated the variables are. 
Graph 1 presents a scatterplot of (the log of) real per capita national income and economic 
freedom (EFW). The two variables are strongly positively correlated: countries with more 
economic freedom and less governmental interference tend to have healthier richer economies. 
The negative correlation between national income and corruption is on display in Graph 2. 
There, we present two different measures of corruption: CE measures a country’s index of 
corruption in absolute terms; CP measures a country’s corruption, relative to other countries. 
                                                          
our sample is 0.861. In empirical results that could not be included due to space limitations but which are available 
upon request, we re-do our analysis here using the Index of Economic Freedom and find very similar results. 
8 A handful of countries are not in the data set in 2002. For example, Armenia’s first year in the EFW is 2004. We 
have data on 118 countries starting annually in 2002 and by 2005 we have a total of 136 countries in the data set.  
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Regardless of how it is measured, countries that are more corrupt tend to be much poorer. 
Finally, Graph 3 illustrates the correlation between corruption and economic freedom. The two 




4 A More Detailed Look: Panel Vector Autoregressions 
One of the largest obstacles to resolving the question of causality is that all three variables—
income, economic freedom and corruption--are likely endogenous. Corruption decreases 
incomes; low incomes make it more likely that people engage in corruption. Economic freedom 
changes the returns to corruption; bureaucrats may decrease economic freedom to further exploit 
gains from corruption. Economic freedom directly increases national income; poor countries may 
require increased regulation because they have poorly developed markets (a dubious hypothesis, 
but a logically possible one). The causal arrows cannot be established using theory alone. These 
questions require empirical analysis. 
We explore fully the reciprocal dynamics between economic freedom, corruption, and 
national income via a panel VAR model. A VAR model grows exponentially more complicated 
with each additional variable and lag that is added. Rather than reporting all the coefficients, we 
show the impulse response functions (IRFs) from each model. Before we can estimate a VAR, 
regardless of whether it is in panels or not, we must first verify that the data are stationary 
(integrated). Second, if they are integrated, we must verify that they are not cointegrated. If they 
are integrated, but not cointegrated, then a VAR model can be estimated in the first-differences. 
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For each country in the dataset (N=136), and for each variable involved (lnrGDPpc, 
EFW, CE, and CP), we conducted an Augmented Dickey Fuller test of stationarity. ADF tests 
have been found to be sensitive to the number of lags included in the model. To circumvent this 
difficulty, we estimated the ADF tests for lags of 1, 2, and 3.9 We tested at the 5% level. Simple 
Type-I error would be expected to lead to N=7 false positives (136*0.05=6.8). In each instance, 
the number of countries that were found to be integrated far exceeded the number that would be 
expected from Type-I error. This was true, regardless of whether the model included a 
deterministic trend or not. For example, 16 (21) countries’ GDPs were found to be integrated, 
when tested against a 3-lag model with (without) a deterministic trend.  
Having established that the variables are integrated, we must check whether they are 
cointegrated. A panel cointegration test was not computable given the unbalanced dataset and the 
small number of time periods in the dataset.10 Thus, we conduct a series of country-by-country 
tests. We calculated a set of Engle Granger (1987) tests for cointegration between lnrGDPpc, 
EFW, and corruption (CE or CP). Only two countries showed any cointegration when corruption 
was measured by CE; only one, when corruption was measured by CP. Similar results held in a 
test including trend in the model: 4 (CE) and 3 (CP) countries showed cointegration. These 
numbers are far fewer than the 7 (6.8) countries that would be expected to show cointegration 
from Type-I error. Thus, we conclude that income, corruption, and economic freedom are not 
cointegrated. Thus, we do not need to estimate a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM), but 
rather a VAR. 
                                                          
9 We estimated 3,288 ADF tests: 137 (the number of countries) x 4 (variables) x 2 (with and without trend) x 3 (the 
number of lags). 
10 As noted earlier, our data spans from 2002-2013 for 118 countries and a minimum of 2005-2013 for the remaining 
17 countries in our unbalanced panel.  
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The literature on VARs is fractured regarding estimating a VAR on integrated variables. 
Christopher Sims (1980) implies that differencing is not necessary and would throw away 
important information. Others, such as Peter Phillips (1998) disagree. He argues that IRFs from 
unrestricted VARs are inconsistent in the presence of unit roots. Given these problems of 
spurious regression, we focus on pVARs with differenced data.  
How many lags should be included in the differenced pVAR models? We calculated the 
coefficient of determination for pVARS in differences with lags of one through four. Regardless 
of whether corruption was measured as CE or CE, the coefficient of determination indicated that 
models with three lags were preferred.  
In Graph 4, we show the IRFs from a pVAR in differences, where corruption is measured 
by CE, the absolute score on corruption. Graph 5 reports same for CP, the percentile rank of 
corruption. The two sets of IRFs show similar dynamics, only differing by their magnitudes. 
That is, the overall dynamics do not seem to depend on whether corruption is measured in 
absolute terms, or relative to the corruption of other countries. Both sets of estimates have 
eigenvalues inside the unit circle, indicating stability. 
Graphs 4 and 5 show that an increase in (the change of) corruption (d.CE or d.CP) is not 
necessarily lingering: it tends to diminish over time. Moreover, this one-time increase in 
corruption has a negligible effect on economic freedom and GDP.11 An increase in economic 
freedom, on the other hand, decreases corruption and increases per capita wealth accumulation. 
Finally, increases in wealth accumulation have no meaningful effect on corruption. Increases in 
wealth accumulation, however, are correlated with small yet statistically significant increases in 
                                                          
11 This is one place where the unreported Index of Economic Freedom results differ. Using the Index of Economic 
Freedom, we find that increasing corruption decreases economic freedom. 
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economic freedom. In summary, economic freedom decreases corruption and improves the 
economy and these results hold regardless of whether corruption is absolute or relative. 
Does the effect of corruption depend on whether the country is already over-regulated in 
terms of economic freedom? Are the proponents of the efficient corruption hypothesis such as 
Leff (1964), Huntington (1968), Shleifer and Vishny (1993) and Mauro (1995) correct? Is 
corruption a second-best escape-valve from over-burdensome restrictions on free trade? To 
answer these questions, we split our sample into two groups: countries that are more free than 
average (EFW > 6.8), and those that are less (EFW < 6.8)? If the efficient corruption hypothesis 
is correct, then increases in corruption will decrease incomes in high-EFW countries, but will 
decrease incomes by less (or even raise them) in low-EFW countries.  
To limit the proliferation of graphs, we restrict ourselves to estimating the model 
corruption measured only as CE. Graph 6a shows the IRF from a pVAR on economically free 
countries; Graph 6b repeats this for economically unfree countries. For both samples, the 
estimates pass the eigenvalue test for stability, with all eigenvalues inside the unit circle. In 
Graph 6a we see, once again, the same familiar dynamics between the three variables. The fact 
that shocks to d.CE have the same effect on d.lnrGDPpc, regardless of whether we are looking at 
economically free or un-free countries, would seem to imply that the efficient corruption 
hypothesis is merely wishful thinking. 
 
5 Conclusion 
Income, economic freedom, and corruption interact in complex ways. All three variables are 
arguably endogenous. In this paper, we explicitly modeled the endogeneity using a panel VAR 
framework. The pVAR models we estimate are better able to model endogeneity than the single-
14 
 
equation panel data models that have been estimated elsewhere in the literature. That is, we are 
better able to capture the reciprocal causality between the variables. The pVAR models that we 
estimate provide evidence that corruption and regulations have a negative effect on national 
income. 
Many previous studies in the literature acknowledge that the institutional setting helps 
determine income, but few examine the possibility that the setting determines the impact of 
corruption on income.  The two exceptions are Swaleen and Stansel (2007) and Heckelman and 
Powell (2010). Our final set of pVARs detects no evidence that corruption provides a safety 
valve from stifling government regulation. This is most likely because the prospect of ill-gotten 
gains creates the regulation in the first place. That is, the regulation is endogenous. The pVARs 
here reveal that, once this endogeneity is taken into account—that is, once we allow for the 
possibility that regulation increases corruption—we find that corruption makes countries poorer.  
That said, it is hard to prove a negative. Panel VARs require estimating many 
coefficients, which decreases the available degrees of freedom, and makes detecting statistically 
small changes difficult.12 This is doubly true when the sample is split in half to test on high-EFW 
and low-EFW subsamples. Perhaps the effect exists, but is not detectible with the current amount 
of data. Once more data are collected, we might be able to confirm the efficient corruption 
hypothesis. But at this point, we argue that there is not enough evidence to support this 
hypothesis.  
One hypothesis worth considering for future research is that weak economies, which 
usually are already struggling with corruption, have little to no efficiency to spare. In this case, a 
little bit of additional corruption would have a greater impact on those economies. This might be 
                                                          
12 It is for this reason it is not possible to look at all areas of economic freedom and determine the area that would be 
most consistent with the efficient corruption hypothesis.  
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termed the “increasing marginal cost of corruption” hypothesis. This could be tested by splitting 
the sample into highly-corrupt, and negligibly-corrupt groups, and re-estimating the pVARs. If 
the hypothesis is correct, then a one unit increase in corruption would decrease incomes more in 
the highly-corrupt sample than in the negligibly corrupt countries. We leave this for future 
research. An additional research idea to explore with more years of data would be the relative 




Graph 1: Economic Freedom and National Income 
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Graph 4: pvar dlnrGDPpc dEFW dCE, lags(3) 
 
 




































































































Graph 6a: pvar dlnrGDPpc dEFW dCE if EFW>=6.802, lags(3) 
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